Author: Robert McCabe

Subsea infrastructure, in particular data cables, are at the forefront of debates on the intersections between security and technology. While many of the current technologies employed in the subsea space require human oversight to operate, process and analyze data, interpret threats, and formulate responses, the emergent technological trend is toward more persistent, autonomous, and intelligent systems that can carry out some of these tasks independently.

However, technology alone is not a panacea for subsea infrastructure protection. In practice, human oversight, ingenuity, and expertise is a critical part of this picture. In a very practical sense, the demand for subsea cabling has overtaken the availability of marine vessels and skilled professionals needed for surveying, installation, and repair. At the same time, competition for undersea space – driven by offshore wind farms, oil and gas pipelines, and electricity interconnectors – is intensifying.

I reflect on some of the emergent technologies in this space in a recent article for The Journal of Ocean Technology available to read open access here: https://www.thejot.net/article-preview/?show_article_preview=1645

The Joint Committee on the UK National Security Strategy published a new report on Subsea telecommunications cables: resilience and crisis preparedness this week.

The report acknowledges that while a severe disruption to the network of UK subsea infrastructure is currently low, the government has a duty to prepare competently for such low-likelihood but high-impact events. This is particularly true in an era of rising geopolitical tensions, degrading international security norms, and where critical amounts of data are being concentrated in new high-capacity cables, creating a potential “small set of high-value targets”. While the threat from malicious activity is at present best described as latent, the report highlights that in the event of active hostilities, the UK’s subsea infrastructure is a “strategic vulnerability” and therefore mitigating catastrophic risk should be a priority. The Centre for Peace and Security (CPS) Maritime Security Team’s written evidence was referenced in the report in relation to threat typology, emergent technologies, and future trends.

Our SALIENT project’s work toward creating a new crisis management framework for UK subsea infrastructure directly supports key aims in the report such as calls for integrated monitoring and alert systems to improve early warning, better impact assessments and contingency plans across key sectors, and better governance through cross-government co-ordination to improve join-up and to address tensions between commercial and security objectives.

To read the report, visit [external link]: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49566/documents/264088/default