Two weeks ago, Robert and I, had the pleasure of introducing our SALIENT funded project at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop in the Republic of Ireland. The workshop, ‘Integrating Cyber Awareness in Government and Private Sector Networks for Cooperative Critical Underwater Infrastructure Protection’, was funded through NATO’s Science for Peace and Security programme. We were two members of the four person organising committee.
The event brought together civil servants, security personnel, subsea cable industry representatives and academics from multiple European countries to discuss cable security. Across one and a half days, discussions focused on the current threat situation around subsea cables and the technological and governance responses being deployed to enhance cable security, particularly in Northern European waters.
While the full set of insights from the event will be captured in a forthcoming project report and edited volume, I was struck by a couple of things in particular. First, there was fascinating analysis of the different ways cables could be weaponised and recognition of the need to consider the whole cable supply chain when considering risk and resilience. There was also passionate discussion about the implications of the increased securitisation of cables for the broader governance of the sector, alongside principles such as freedom of navigation. Securitisation has practical consequences on how the day-to-day functioning of the subsea cable industry operates and we need to understand these impacts, positive or negative, in greater detail.
Second, there was common agreement that a multiplicity of actors – state and non-state – have a role to play in cable security and that a whole of society approach was needed to pursue greater subsea cable resilience. The work of NATO, the European Union, and different European governments was discussed and the importance of trust building to underpin these collaborative efforts was a consistent theme. The workshop emphasised that there remain challenges in facilitating effective cooperation, particularly between governments and industry, with differences between collective approaches to risk management, data/knowledge sharing and long-term planning noted.
Overall, I was struck by the commonality of purpose expressed by those present at the workshop. There was universal agreement that subsea cables were important, that the potential negative impact of a major security incident across multiple cables could be significant, even if the likelihood of such an event remains relatively low. There was acceptance that no one group of actors, or one country can tackle the security challenge alone; that cooperative forums exist within and between countries, but they could be more effectively utilised. This is a timely reminder that committing to cooperation and subsequently establishing top-level structures to facilitate it is so often easier that ensuring the mechanics of cooperation on a day-to-day basis function optimally in different threat environments. It is here that I hope our SALIENT project on multi-actor crisis information-sharing can make a positive contribution to knowledge and practice.
